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Paying the Price: Should Corporations’ Payment of 
Their Employees’ Legal Fees be a Factor in Corporate 
Indictment Decisions? 
John J. Rehmann* 
INTRODUCTION 
Business organizations1 in the United States may be held 
criminally liable for the misconduct of their employees.2 In the past 
decade, the executive branch has seen fit to devise a set of guidelines 
to provide federal prosecutors with a systematic method for 
determining whether to, in fact, bring criminal charges against a 
corporation for the criminal deeds of its employees.3 In recent years 
much controversy has erupted over a number of these guidelines. 
Most of the institutional advocacy and legal scholarship to date has 
focused on the implications of federal prosecutors in making their 
indictment decision, taking into consideration whether a corporation 
has agreed to waive its attorney-client privilege.4 In 2006, however, 
the judiciary and Congress joined the fracas by calling into question 
the legitimacy of another guideline, one that draws prosecutors’ 
 
 * J.D. (2008), Washington University School of Law. I would like to convey my 
deepest appreciation and gratitude to my family for your support and encouragement, and to 
Professor Emily Hughes for reviewing earlier drafts and providing insightful feedback. I would 
also like to thank Karen Popp for her mentorship and for inspiring me to write on the topic of 
this Note. 
 1. Throughout this Note, I will often use terms such as corporation, firm, and entity 
interchangeably. I do so in accordance with the statutory definition of organizations subject to 
criminal liability, under which all such bodies qualify. See 18 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).  
 2. See infra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. See also 1 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, 
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 89–118 (1991) [hereinafter BRICKEY, CORPORATE 
LIABILITY] (providing a general overview of the imputation of criminal conduct to 
corporations). 
 3. See infra notes 9, 28, 104 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 15, 47. 
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attention to whether employers have advanced the legal fees of their 
employees5 under investigation.6 
While it would be ideal to simply provide that any prosecutorial 
consideration that could marginally infringe on a corporation or its 
employees’ rights should not be a factor in indictment decisions, the 
answer is not that simple. One need look no further than Enron and 
the ensuing wave of similarly devastating financial crimes committed 
by corporations in recent years to see that the need for effective 
enforcement is paramount.7 Accordingly, it is more crucial now than 
ever to find a proper balance between protecting individual rights and 
recognizing legitimate law enforcement endeavors. This Note sets out 
to do just that by focusing on the emerging issue of employee legal 
fee advancement as an appropriate prosecutorial consideration. 
Part I of this Note surveys the development of federal 
prosecutorial guidelines for corporations. It begins by discussing the 
first set of formal guidelines for corporate indictment decisions, 
promulgated in 1999, and the policies that were incorporated therein. 
Next, this section considers the events that began to unfold shortly 
thereafter, namely the massive influx of corporate scandals beginning 
with Enron’s collapse in 2001 and how the executive branch 
responded. Part I concludes with an overview of what, until recently, 
were the revised corporate prosecutorial guidelines, developed in 
2003, to combat the evolution in corporate financial crime. 
Part II outlines the reaction these revised guidelines received from 
the private sector and eventually the judiciary and Congress. This 
section describes the major criticisms and arguments that have been 
levied against using the advancement of legal fees as a factor in 
corporate indictment decisions, as well as several alternatives that 
have been proposed. Part II closes with the executive branch’s recent 
response to these criticisms—the promulgation of the current 
guidelines. 
 
 5. For ease of expression, the term “employee(s)” in this Note refers to a current or 
former agency relationship between the individual and the business entity. In addition to lower 
level employees, an agency relationship exists between employers and directors, officers, and 
partners. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01(c) (2006).  
 6. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 7. See infra Part I.B. 
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Part III analyzes the arguments that have been raised against the 
consideration of legal fee advancement. It starts by fleshing out the 
arguments’ underlying premises to examine their validity, and then 
turns to the alternatives that have been proposed, evaluating each to 
determine if it would serve as an effective solution. Part IV begins by 
suggesting a new standard, and then proceeds to compare that 
standard both with the goals that have been outlined throughout this 
Note, as well as the other solutions that have been offered. The 
proposal introduced by this Note, I conclude, best reaches a balance 
between protecting the interests of corporations and their employees, 
while at the same time allowing prosecutors to consider legal fee 
advancement in the appropriate context.  
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL GUIDELINES 
FOR CORPORATE ENTITIES 
A. Guidelines Pre-Enron 
Prior to 1999, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
did not have a formal policy in place to evaluate criminal conduct by 
corporate entities for the purpose of making prosecutorial decisions.8 
In 1999, the DOJ set out to provide this missing guidance in a 
memorandum authored by then Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder 
(“Holder Memo”).9 The Holder Memo laid out “factors [that] should 
generally inform a prosecutor in making the decision whether to 
charge a corporation in a particular case.”10 While not outcome-
 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 17–24 for a discussion of federal prosecutorial 
policy with regard to corporate entities prior to 1999. 
 9. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all U.S.D.O.J. Component 
Heads and U.S. Att’ys (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memo] (on file with the U.S.D.O.J.), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/append/ix/appendixK.pdf. The Holder 
Memo identifies the “great benefits” that come from “vigorous enforcement” of criminal laws 
against corporations. Id. § I.A. The guidelines promulgated in the Holder Memo were likely an 
effort to create “a more systematic approach to handling criminal violations by corporations.” 
Mary Robeck et al., Corporate Cooperation in the Face of Government Investigations, 17 
HEALTH LAW. 20, 21–22 (2005). See infra notes 17–24 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the decidedly unsystematic approach that federal prosecutors employed in corporate criminal 
indictment decision-making before the Holder Memo was promulgated.  
 10. Holder Memo, supra note 9, at introductory cmt.  
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determinative or binding on prosecutors,11 these factors were 
designed to “provide a useful framework” in which prosecutors could 
analyze cases.12  
The Holder Memo identifies eight factors that may be relevant to 
prosecutors when determining whether to bring charges.13 Of 
significance is the fourth factor, which draws prosecutorial attention 
to “[t]he corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing 
and its willingness to cooperate with the government’s investigation 
of its agents . . . .”14 The Holder Memo provides guidance on how to 
assess a corporation’s cooperation, namely “whether the corporation 
appears to be protecting its culpable employees and agents.”15 It 
states:  
Thus, while cases will differ depending on the circumstances, a 
corporation’s promise of support to culpable employees and 
agents, either through the advancing of attorneys fees, [or] 
 
 11. Id. See also Nancy Kestenbaum & Jason P. Criss, Credit Where Credit is Due? The 
Role of Internal Investigations in the Outcome of Government Investigations, 1564 CORP. L. & 
PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, 152 n.2 (2006) (“[T]he Holder Memo provided guidance 
. . . but was not binding.”).  
 12. See Holder Memo, supra note 9, at introductory cmt.  
 13.  
[P]rosecutors should consider the following factors in reaching a decision as to the 
proper treatment of a corporate target: 1. The nature and seriousness of the offense, . . . 
2. The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, . . . 3. The corporation’s 
history of similar conduct, . . . 4. The corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of 
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, . . . 5. 
The existence and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance program, . . . 6. The 
corporation’s remedial actions, . . . 7. Collateral consequences, . . . and 8. The 
adequacy of non-criminal remedies . . . .  
Id. § II.A.  
 14. Id. § II.A.4. As justification for the relevancy of this factor, the Holder Memo states:  
In investigating wrongdoing by or within a corporation, a prosecutor is likely to 
encounter several obstacles resulting from the nature of the corporation, itself. It will 
often be difficult to determine which individuals took which action on behalf of the 
corporation. . . . Accordingly, a corporation’s cooperation may be critical in 
identifying the culprits and locating relevant evidence. 
Id. § VI.B. The Holder Memo makes clear, however, that “a corporation’s willingness to 
cooperate is merely one relevant factor, one that needs to be considered in conjunction with 
other factors.” Id. 
 15. Id. Another factor that the Holder Memo identifies in assessing the adequacy of a 
corporation’s cooperation is “the completeness of its disclosure including, if necessary, a 
waiver of the attorney-client and work product protections . . . .” Id. 
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through retaining the employees without sanction for their 
misconduct. . .may be considered by the prosecutor in 
weighing the extent and value of a corporation’s cooperation.16  
While novel in its approach to provide an explicit framework of 
analysis for the treatment of target corporations, the Holder Memo 
was modeled after well-established prosecutorial principles. Indeed, 
prior to the inception of the Holder Memo, the analysis for corporate 
prosecutorial decisions was treated in much the same way as 
individual prosecutions—guided by DOJ policy found in the United 
States Attorney’s Manual (“USAM”).17 The USAM section titled 
“Principles of Federal Prosecution” states that prosecutors should 
consider an individual’s willingness to cooperate when making the 
decision whether to initiate or decline prosecution.18 
Moreover, in 1991, seven years before the inception of the Holder 
Memo, the United States Sentencing Commission19 amended the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, adding a new chapter titled 
“Sentencing of Organizations” (“Organizational Guidelines”).20 The 
Organizational Guidelines filled a void in the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines by serving as a guide for federal courts sentencing 
 
 16. Id. (footnote omitted). Importantly, the Holder Memo distinguishes between 
corporations that voluntarily pay the legal fees of their officers and those that are required under 
state law to pay the fees. Id. § VI.B n.3. For corporations that are mandated by state law to pay 
the legal fees of their officers, such payment should not be considered by prosecutors as 
indicative of non-cooperation. Id. 
 17. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATT’YS’ MANUAL § 9-27.00 (2005) [hereinafter U.S. 
ATT’YS’ MANUAL]; see also Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investigations: Consequences of the 
Federal Deputation of Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 113–14 (2003) (describing 
DOJ practices outlined in the USAM). The Holder Memo explicitly incorporates the 
considerations outlined in the USAM, stating, “Generally prosecutors should apply the same 
factors in determining whether to charge a corporation as they do with respect to individuals.” 
Holder Memo, supra note 9, § II.A.  
 18. U.S. ATT’YS’ MANUAL § 9-27.230B6 (“A person’s willingness to cooperate in the 
investigation or prosecution of others is another appropriate consideration in the determination 
whether a Federal prosecution should be undertaken.”); cf. id. § 9.27.420B1 (“The defendant’s 
willingness to provide timely and useful cooperation as part of his/her plea agreement should be 
given serious consideration.”). 
 19. The United States Sentencing Commission is an independent agency in the judicial 
branch charged with developing guidelines and policy statements for courts to use when 
“sentencing offenders convicted of federal crimes.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 1A1.1 cmt. background (2005).  
 20. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 (amended 1991) [hereinafter Organizational 
Guidelines]. 
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corporate entities.21 Among other things, the Organizational 
Guidelines strongly promote and incentivize cooperation and 
acceptance of responsibility by corporate defendants.22 Importantly, 
the Organizational Guidelines also call for an effective compliance 
program,23 which includes “appropriate incentives” for employees to 
perform in accordance with the program and “appropriate 
disciplinary measures” for employees engaging in criminal conduct.24 
Thus, the consideration in the Holder Memorandum of a 
corporation’s cooperation and measures to determine the authenticity 
of that cooperation was a logical extension of the considerations that 
were already embedded within the criminal justice system.  
B. Enron Changes the Landscape 
The issue of criminal conduct of corporations and their employees 
took center stage in December 2001, when Enron, then the nation’s 
seventh largest corporation, filed for bankruptcy.25 The bankruptcy 
came amidst rumors of a widespread accounting scandal after the 
company announced a $618 million net loss for the third quarter of 
2001.26 When the dust settled, the company’s collapse cost its 
shareholders $68 billion and thousands of employees lost their jobs 
 
 21. Id. app. C, amend. 422 (“This [A]mendment adds guidelines and policy statements to 
address the sentencing of organizational defendants.”). The Supreme Court has since held that 
the Organizational Guidelines are merely advisory. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 
259 (2005).  
 22. See, e.g., Organizational Guidelines, supra note 20, § 8C2.5(g) (granting a reduction 
in the organization’s “culpability score” for reporting offenses to government authorities, fully 
cooperating in the investigation, and “clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative 
acceptance of responsibility”). As one commentator opined, prior to the Holder Memo, “[t]he 
Organizational Guidelines, with their attention to corporate cooperation, also operated as a type 
of paradigm for federal prosecutors who saw in them some direction in making corporate 
charging decisions caused by the void in DOJ policy.” Finder, supra note 17, at 114.  
 23. An effective compliance program, under the Organization Guidelines, requires an 
organization to “exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct” and “otherwise 
promote an organizational culture that encourages . . . compliance with the law.” Organizational 
Guidelines, supra note 20, § 8B2.1(a). 
 24. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(6). 
 25. Voluntary Petition, In re Enron Corp, No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed 
Dec. 2, 2001). 
 26. Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime after 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 360–62 (2003) [hereinafter Brickey, From Enron to 
WorldCom].  
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and retirement funds.27 This loss, staggering in its own right, seems 
magnified by the fact that it was caused by the criminal conduct of 
corporate fiduciaries.28  
As soon became clear, Enron was not an anomaly, but rather the 
first major indication of a seemingly pervasive pattern of criminal 
activity across corporate America.29 Less than a year after Enron’s 
bankruptcy, WorldCom, another Fortune 500 company and 
telecommunications powerhouse, filed for bankruptcy after 
announcing a $3.8 billion accounting restatement.30 Like Enron, the 
company’s downfall was brought about by the criminal behavior of 
its executives, cost hundreds of thousands of investors billions of 
dollars, and eliminated thousands of jobs and employee retirement 
 
 27. Thomas S. Mulligan, The Enron Verdicts; Enron’s Top Executives are Convicted of 
Fraud, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at A1. For an in-depth discussion of the Enron scandal and 
its financial impact, see John Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron 
Prosecutor’s Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57 (2005); BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER 
ELKIND, SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF 
ENRON (2003). 
 28. See generally Regal-Beloit Corp. v. Drecoli, 955 F. Supp. 849, 857–58 (N.D. Ill. 
1996) (“It is a well-established common law principle that corporate officers and directors owe 
a fiduciary duty of utmost good faith and loyalty to their corporations.” This “implies that the 
[corporation] has reposed some trust or confidence in the agent.”). In Enron’s case sixteen 
former officers and directors, including Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow, Chief 
Accounting Officer Richard Causey, Chief Executive Officer Jeffrey Skilling, and Chairman 
Kenneth Lay, were convicted of federal criminal offenses stemming from their activities at 
Enron. Mulligan, supra note 27.  
 29. See generally Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom, supra note 26, at 358 (“In the 
beginning, it was widely assumed that the Enron scandal was an anomaly. But it soon became 
clear that this was anything but an isolated case of financial accounting fraud at a major 
corporation.”); Nancy Browning, Developments in Corporate Scandals in 2004, 24 ANN. REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 223, 227 (2005) (discussing notable corporate criminal scandals that have 
been uncovered in the wake of Enron); Mark Robeck et al., supra note 9, at 23 (“The fall of 
Enron was followed by the exposure of a disappointingly high number of other corporate 
scandals, leading to intense government and public scrutiny of corporate America.”). 
 30. Mary K. Rameriz, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing 
the Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 956 (2005). Hints of 
a scandal at WorldCom began to surface in February 2002, when the company first reported 
that its fourth quarter profit for the previous year fell 64%. Floyd Norris, MCI Chief Says He 
Repaid Debt, Borrowing from His Company, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at C2. Bernard Ebbers, 
WorldCom’s Chief Executive Officer and President, later admitted that he owed the company 
$339.7 million on two loans. Id. Finally, in July, the company had to file for bankruptcy after it 
came to light that it had been improperly masking billions of dollars in losses as expenses. See 
Reuters, WorldCom Restates Profits by $74.4 Billion for 2 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2004, at 
C14. 
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savings.31 In the years immediately following the Enron and 
WorldCom revelations, criminally fraudulent activity at no less than 
nineteen other major U.S. corporations came to light, including 
Adelphia Communications, the nation’s sixth largest provider of 
cable services; Rite Aid, a national drug store chain; Qwest 
Communications, the dominant provider of telephone service on the 
West Coast; and HealthSouth, the largest operator of rehabilitation 
medical centers in the country.32 In total, corporate financial crimes 
in the first few years of this decade cost investors more than $300 
billion and tens of thousands of employees lost their jobs and 
retirement security.33  
With the issue of corporate crime garnering massive media 
attention and drawing public outcry,34 President Bush moved quickly 
in response.35 In July 2002, the President established a Corporate 
 
 31. Brook A. Masters & Amy Joyce, Ebbers Starts 25-Year Term for Fraud at Worldcom, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2006, at D1. Ebbers and Chief Financial Officer Scott Sullivan were 
both convicted of federal criminal offenses for their roles in the company’s $11 billion 
accounting fraud. Id. It was alleged by the government that Ebbers and Sullivan “jointly 
devised means to artificially inflate earnings to meet analysts’ expectations” and made 
“misleading claims about the significant revenue growth and WorldCom’s robust financial 
condition.” Kathleen F. Brickey, Symposium: White Collar Criminal Law in Comparative 
Perspective: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Enron’s Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 221, 
269–70 (2004) [hereinafter Brickey, Symposium]. Sullivan and WorldCom’s Senior Vice 
President and Controller, David Meyers; Director of General Accounting, Buford Yates; 
Director of Management Reporting, Betty Vinson; and Director of Legal Entity Accounting, 
Troy Normand were also charged separately and pled guilty to conspiracy and securities fraud 
for their part in the scandal. Id. at 266–67. The fraud and resulting bankruptcy of WorldCom, 
the nation’s second largest telecommunications company, wiped out an estimated 20,000 jobs. 
Masters & Joyce, supra. 
 32. See Brickey, Symposium, supra note 31, at 226–28, 247.  
 33. John Byrne, Fall from Grace, BUS. WK., Aug. 12, 2002, at 51. 
 34. A LexisNexis search yielded 7,242 articles concerning “corporate crime” published in 
major U.S. Newspapers in the eight months between Enron’s bankruptcy announcement and the 
establishment of the Corporate Fraud Task Force. See, e.g., Amey Stone & Eric Wahlgren, The 
Street’s Death of a Thousand Cuts, BUS. WK.ONLINE, Feb. 28, 2002 (Continuing corporate 
fraud “revelations [have] charred any remaining shred of confidence the . . . public has in the 
integrity of Corporate America.”). A June 2002 Gallup Poll found that confidence in “Big 
Business” was at its lowest point in over twenty years. Id. A separate survey of jurors found 
that 62% “felt that their opinion of corporations had changed for the worse during 2002.” Ed 
Aro et al., How Juries and Judges are Reexamining Duties of Directors, Officers in Wake of 
Corporate Scandals, 72 U.S.L.W. 2459 (Feb. 10, 2004).  
 35. “[O]ver the past year, high-profile acts of deception in corporate America have shaken 
people’s trust in corporations, the markets, and the economy . . . . The American people need to 
know we’re acting. We’re moving, and we’re moving fast.” Remarks at the Corporate Fraud 
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Fraud Task Force (“Task Force”).36 The Task Force, chaired by the 
sitting Deputy Attorney General, was charged with providing 
direction for the investigation and prosecution of financial crimes 
committed by corporations and their employees.37  
C. The Thompson Memorandum 
As part of the advancement of the Task Force’s mission, in 
January 2003, then Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson 
authored a memorandum titled “Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations” (“Thompson Memo”).38 Building on the 
Holder Memo,39 the Thompson Memo laid out “a revised set of 
principles to guide [federal] prosecutors as they make the decision 
whether to seek charges against a business organization.”40  
The main focus of the revisions is increased emphasis on and 
scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation. Too 
 
Conference, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1665, 1665–66 (Sept. 26, 2002), available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020926-10.html. 
 36. Exec. Order No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. 245 (2003) 091 (2002–2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020709-2.html. Later that same month 
the President also signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 
Stat. 745 (2002). Notably, Titles VII and IX of the Act address “Corporate and Criminal Fraud 
Accountability” and “White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements” respectively. 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1341, 1501 (Supp. II 2002). As President Bush noted when he signed the Act, “This law 
gives my administration new tools for enforcement. We will use them to the fullest.” Remarks 
on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1319, 1321 (July 30, 2002), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730.html. “[E]very 
dishonest corporate leader . . . will be exposed and punished.” Id. at 1319. For a comprehensive 
discussion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act see, e.g., Brain Kim, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 235 (2003); Corey Braddock, Comment, Penny Wise, Pound Foolish: Why Investors 
Would be Foolish to Pay a Penny or a Pound for the Protections Provided by Sarbanes-Oxley, 
2006 BYU L. REV. 175. 
 37. Exec. Order No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. 245 (2002–2003). By “overseeing the investigation 
of corporate abusers and bringing them to account” the Task Force was to “function as a 
financial crimes SWAT team.” Remarks on Corporate Responsibility in New York City, 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 1194, 1196 (July 9, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2002/07/20020709-4.html. For more detailed information about the Task Force, see USDOJ: 
DAG: Corporate Fraud Task Force, http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2006). 
 38. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all U.S.D.O.J. Heads 
of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memo] (on file 
with the U.S.D.O.J.), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_organizations.pdf.  
 39. See Holder Memo, supra note 9. 
 40. Thompson Memo, supra note 38, introductory comment. 
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often business organizations, while purporting to cooperate 
with a Department investigation, in fact take steps to impede 
the quick and effective exposure of the complete scope of 
wrongdoing under investigation. The revisions make clear that 
such conduct should weigh in favor of a corporate 
prosecution.41  
In substance, the Thompson Memo simply adopts, nearly word for 
word, the factors outlined in the Holder Memo.42 True to its word, 
however, the Thompson Memo, unlike the Holder Memo, explicitly 
draws prosecutorial attention to “whether the corporation, while 
purporting to cooperate, has engaged in conduct that impedes the 
investigation.”43 One other notable aspect is that, unlike the Holder 
Memorandum, the factors outlined in the Thompson Memorandum 
were binding on federal prosecutors.44  
II. REACTION TO THE THOMPSON MEMO 
While the DOJ policy statements in the Holder Memo went 
largely unnoticed in the shadow of the Enron-era scandals,45 the 
Thompson Memo’s solidification of those policies created a windfall 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Finder, supra note 17, at 116. Indeed, the language used in the fourth factor of the 
Thompson Memo, concerning the corporation’s cooperation in the government investigation 
and its voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing, is carried over directly from the Holder Memo. 
Compare Holder Memo, supra note 9, § II.A.4 with Thompson Memo, supra note 38, § I.A.4. 
But see Thompson Memo, supra note 38, § II.A.8 (adding one new factor that was not explicit 
in the Holder Memo).  
 43. Thompson Memo, supra note 38, § VI.B. The Thompson Memo goes on to identify 
examples of such conduct, which include “overly broad assertions of corporate representation 
of employees or former employees.” Id.  
 44. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 163 (2005), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00163.htm (“The 
Thompson Memorandum sets forth nine factors that federal prosecutors must consider in 
determining whether to charge a corporation or other business organization.”) (emphasis 
added). See also Carmen Couden, Note, The Thompson Memorandum: A Revised Solution or 
Just a Problem?, 30 J. CORP. L. 405, 416 (2005) (“[C]orporations [should] consider the 
provisions set forth in the Thompson Memorandum as government ‘rules’ rather than 
discretionary ‘guidelines’ . . . .”).  
 45. See Finder, supra note 17, at 115 (“Public sympathy for the legal rights of entities and 
their employees so profoundly affected by the Holder Memorandum was minimal or 
nonexistent as compared to the outrage expressed in favor of victims of corporate fraud and 
abuse.”). 
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of criticism, beginning in the private sector, and then moving to the 
judicial and legislative branches, which eventually evoked a response 
by the executive branch. 
A. The Private Sector 
Opposition to the Thompson Memo began with criticism from not 
only the legal profession, but also from the business community and 
civil liberties organizations.46 The vast majority of reform effort 
focused on protecting the perceived threat posed by the Thompson 
Memo to the attorney-client privilege.47 However, the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”),48 amongst others,49 was an outspoken critic of 
 
 46. An apt example of the “diverse and broadly representative constituency . . . all of 
whom are concerned by the governmental policies and practices” articulated in the Thompson 
Memo, is the Coalition to Preserve the Attorney-Client Privilege (“Coalition”). Submission to 
the Senate Judiciary Committee Regarding Hearings on Coerced Waiver of the Attorney-Client 
Privilege: The Negative Impact for Clients, Corporate Compliance, and the American Legal 
System (Sept. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Statement of the Coalition], available at http://www.acc. 
com/public/attyclientpriv/coalitionsenjudtestimony.pdf. The Coalition is comprised of, among 
other institutions, the American Chemistry Council, the American Civil Liberties Union, the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Id. 
Moreover, in September 2006, ten former Attorney Generals, Deputy Attorney Generals, and 
Solicitor Generals sent a joint letter to then-current U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales 
expressing their concerns over the Thompson Memo policies and requesting reform. Letter 
from Griffin Bell et al., former Att’y Gen., to Alberto Gonzales, Att’y Gen. (Sept. 5, 2006), 
available at http://www.acc.com/public/attyclientpriv/agsept52006.pdf. 
 47. See, e.g., Letter from Griffin Bell et al., supra note 46 (“[W]e urge the Department to 
revise its policy to state affirmatively that waiver of attorney-client privilege . . . should not be a 
factor in determining whether an organization has cooperated with the government in an 
investigation.”); Statement of the Coalition, supra note 46 (“Privilege waiver should not be . . . 
considered when assessing whether a corporation is cooperating in an investigation . . . .”); THE 
DECLINE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT, SURVEY 
RESULTS 3, COAL. TO PROTECT THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE (2006), available at 
http://www.acc.com/Surveys/attyclient2.pdf (noting that 75% of counsel who responded to the 
survey agree that a “culture of waiver” exists whereby the government expects a corporation 
under investigation to broadly waive its attorney-client privilege or work product protections). 
 48. The ABA, the national representative of the legal profession, provides “initiatives to 
improve the legal system for the public” and “promot[es] justice, professional excellence, and 
respect for the law.” About the American Bar Association, http://www.abanet.org/about/ (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2007). In 2004, the ABA president created a new Presidential Task Force on the 
Attorney-Client Privilege. Press Release, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA President Robert 
Grey Creates Task Force to Advocate for Attorney-Client Privilege (Oct. 6, 2004), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/pressrelease.pdf.  
 49. For example, the Association of Corporate Counsel (“ACC”), which serves as the bar 
association for in-house corporate counsel, proposed a “redline” version of the Thompson 
Memo. See Association of Corporate Counsel, ACC Draft “Redline” of the Thompson 
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the Thompson Memo’s direction to prosecutors that, in making their 
indictment decision, they consider whether a corporation has 
advanced legal fees to its employees.  
To be sure, the ABA has called for the adoption of a government 
policy which uniformly bans permitting prosecutors, “in making a 
determination of whether an organization has been cooperative in the 
context of a government investigation” from taking into consideration 
“that the organization provided counsel to, or advanced, reimbursed 
or indemnified the legal fees and expenses of, an [e]mployee.”50 In 
support of its resolution, the ABA primarily asserts that the incentive 
of being deemed cooperative in the eyes of the government pressures 
corporations to refuse to pay the legal fees of their employees.51 This 
in turn “denies individuals the benefits of representation.”52  
 
Memorandum (Jan. 2006), http://www.acc.com/resource/v7255 (follow “Research” tab; then 
follow “virtual library” hyperlink; search “redline”; follow “ACC Redline” of the Thompson 
Memo hyperlink).  Among other changes, the ACC’s version would require that the culpability 
of agents be proven before payment of their legal fees may be considered by prosecutors. Id. 
See also Lynnley Browning, Judge Presses Companies that Cut Off Legal Fees, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 17, 2006, at C1 (quoting numerous sources criticizing the Thompson Memo’s 
consideration of legal fees advancement). 
 50. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, 
REPORT TO HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RECOMMENDATION ¶ 23–31 (2006), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/emprights_recommendation_adopte
d.pdf. 
 51. See R. William Ide, III, Report to House of Delegates, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
TASK FORCE ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE (2006) [hereinafter ABA REPORT], 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/emprights_report_adopted.pdf. The 
ABA further argues that prosecutors sometimes encourage organizations to decide whether they 
will pay an employee’s legal fees even before a determination of the employee’s culpability in 
any wrongdoing has been established. Id. at 7. 
 52. ABA Report, supra note 51, at 9 (“Even for those Employees who can afford a lawyer, 
it will often be difficult if not impossible to afford a lawyer with the special expertise in white-
collar criminal investigations and prosecutions and to finance the extensive legal work typically 
demanded to receive fully informed advice or to wage an effective defense to white-collar 
criminal allegations.”). 
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B. The Judicial Branch—United States v. Stein53 
The ABA’s arguments, though largely ignored by the DOJ,54 
received affirmation by the Southern District of New York in United 
States v. Stein,55 a case that seemed to typify the concerns that private 
sector critics had about the Thompson Memo. The facts of Stein 
revolved around a highly publicized investigation of KMPG LLP 
(“KPMG”)56 for developing and promoting allegedly illegal tax 
shelters.57  
After catching word of the allegedly abusive tax shelters, the 
United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of 
the Committee on Governmental Affairs (“Subcommittee”)58 began 
 
 53. 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 54. In May 2006, ABA president Michael Greco sent a letter to Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales urging him to modify the DOJ policy. Letter from Michael Greco, President, 
American Bar Association, to Alberto Gonzales, Att’y Gen. (May 2, 2006), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/060502letter_acprivgonz.pdf. Although the 
DOJ responded to the letter, it simply restated its rationale for its current policy. See Letter from 
Crystal Jezierski, Director, Office of Intergovernmental and Public Liaison, U.S.D.O.J. to 
Michael Greco, President, American Bar Association (July 18, 2006), available at http://www. 
abanet.org/poladv/priorities/acpriv/doj-ltr71806.pdf. 
 55. 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The presiding judge, Lewis Kaplan, also issued 
a companion opinion in the same case addressing other criticisms raised against the Thompson 
Memo. See discussion of United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) infra 
note 77.  
 56. KPMG is the United States’ third largest accounting firm and generates more than $4 
billion in revenue annually. S. REP. NO. 109-54, at 11 (2005); see also KPMG INTERNATIONAL, 
KPMG Member Firms’ Financial Performance (2005), http://www.kpmg.com/NR/rdonlyres/ 
869D922B-7431-4503-9007-26D2EA0FA86C/0/IAR2005FinancialPerformance.pdf. 
 57. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). From 1998 through 
2003 KPMG devoted a substantial amount of resources to developing and promoting “generic” 
tax products. S. REP. NO. 109-54, at 12. Unlike traditional tax strategies, which provide 
individualized tax advice to persons who initiate contact with a tax advisor, generic tax products 
are “aggressively marketed to multiple clients.” Id. at 11. As the U.S. Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs explains in its 
report on the topic, generic tax strategies that are widely marketed and not tailored to an 
individual customer can be problematic because: 
In its broadest sense, the term “tax shelter” is a device used to reduce or eliminate the 
tax liability of the tax shelter user. This may encompass legitimate or illegitimate 
endeavors. While there is no one standard to determine the line between legitimate 
“tax planning” and “abusive tax shelters,” the latter can be characterized as 
transactions in which a significant purpose is the avoidance or evasion of Federal, state 
or local tax in a manner not intended by law.  
Id. at 1.  
 58. The Subcommittee’s responsibilities include, investigating the “compliance or 
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an investigation into the tax shelter industry, culminating in two days 
of hearings in November 2003.59 On the first day of the hearings six 
current and former KPMG employees testified.60  
The result of the testimony was not favorable to KPMG.61 Mark 
Watson, a former KPMG partner, acknowledged in his testimony that 
he believed at least one of KPMG’s tax strategies was not in 
compliance with federal tax law.62 Moreover, Jeffery Eischeid, a 
KPMG partner at the time, was admonished by Senator Levin for not 
giving straightforward answers to the Senator’s questions.63 Another 
partner, Philip Wiesner, reluctantly admitted that he was “bothered” 
by the actions that his firm had taken.64 Finally, two tax experts 
testified that they believed KPMG’s tax shelters violated federal tax 
laws.65 
 
noncompliance of . . . corporations . . . or other entities with the rules, regulations, and laws 
governing the various governmental agencies and their relationship with the public.” Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs Full Committee and Subcommittee Jurisdictions for the 109th 
Congress, http://hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=About.Jurisdiction (follow “About the 
Committee” tab; then follow “Jurisdiction” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 8, 2006).  
 59. S. REP. NO. 109-54, at 2.  
 60. Tax professionals testifying from KPMG included: Philip Wiesner, Partner in Charge, 
Washington National Tax Client Services; Jeffrey Eischeid, Partner, Personal Financial 
Planning; Lawrence DeLap, retired National Partner in Charge, Department of Professional 
Practice-Tax; Lawrence Manth, former West Area Partner in Charge, Stratecon; and Richard 
Smith Jr., Vice Chair, Tax Services. Id. Former KPMG partner Mark Watson also testified as a 
tax expert. Id.  
 61. At one point in the hearings Senator Coleman stated, “[A]nd I could spend a lot of 
time getting very angry, as my colleague, I think justifiably, so from Michigan [Senator Levin] 
has been as he has looked at the amounts of tax avoidance as a result of [KPMG’s tax shelter] 
schemes and the impact it has.” U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, 
and Financial Professionals: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the 
S. Governmental Affairs Comm., 108th Cong. 60 (2003) [hereinafter Subcomm. Hearing].  
 62. See Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 61, at 21.  
 63. In response to apparently evasive answers, Senator Levin instructed Eischeid, “Well 
try an honest answer. Just give me a direct answer to this.” Id. at 43. To which Eischeid 
responded, “I’m trying my best, sir.” Id. at 44. Senator Levin continued, “Why isn’t that the 
straightforward answer?” Id.   
 64. Senator Levin asked Wiesner, “Are you troubled now when I tell you [KPMG] went 
ahead and sold [the tax strategy in question]? Does that bother you? Does anything bother you? 
Now I am asking you a direct question.” Id. at 53. Unsatisfied with Wiesner’s answer, Senator 
Levin again asked, “Could you answer my question?” Id. Still unsatisfied, Senator Levin 
requested for a third time, “Are you going to answer my question?” Id. Finally, Weisner 
admitted, “Yes.” Id. 
 65. Id. at 21 (testimony of Debra Peterson), 22 (testimony of Calvin Johnson).  
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Apparently concerned about the impact of the Subcommittee 
Hearing and a parallel investigation by the IRS,66 KMPG decided to 
take a “cooperative approach,” which involved, among other things, 
the decision to “clean house” by terminating the employment of 
several senior level partners, including those who had testified before 
the Subcommittee.67 Despite KPMG’s efforts to stave off trouble, in 
February 2005 the IRS made a criminal referral to the United States 
Attorney’s Office (“USAO”).68 Within days of receiving the referral, 
the USAO issued subject letters to numerous KPMG employees.69 At 
initial meetings with KPMG, prosecutors began expressing an 
interest in whether the firm had an obligation to pay the legal fees of 
its employees under investigation.70 In an apparent effort to appease 
the government, KPMG advised its employees under investigation 
 
 66. In 2002, the IRS served summonses on KPMG requesting records and testimony 
regarding certain company products. See United States v. KMPG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30, 32 
(D.D.C. 2004). 
 67. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Another partner 
asked to leave KMPG was Deputy Chair and CEO Jeffery Stein. Id. Stein’s departure was 
“cushioned substantially” with a severance package that included a $100,000 per month, three-
year consulting contract and an agreement to pay his legal fees for any subsequent suits that 
may be brought against him. Id. 
 68. Id. See generally BRICKEY, 3 CORPORATE LIABILITY, supra note 2, at 6 (“Criminal 
activity that goes well beyond civil or criminal tax violations thus may be discovered and 
referred [by the IRS] to the Justice Department.”). The USAO is the branch of the DOJ 
responsible for “[prosecuting] all offenses against the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 547(1) 
(2000).  
 69. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 341. A subject letter is a “[letter] advising the recipient that 
he or she is a person whose conduct is within the scope of a grand jury investigation.” Id. In all, 
between twenty and thirty subject letters were issued to KPMG employees, including Stein, 
Watson, and Eischeid. Id. 
 70. Id. at 341–45. For example, at one meeting a prosecutor commented that under 
“federal guidelines” employee “misconduct” should not be rewarded. Id. at 342. There was 
substantial debate between the parties in pretrial proceedings regarding what the prosecutors 
meant by this. The government testified that it was trying to determine what type of severance 
agreements KPMG had entered with its terminated employees, and that by “federal guidelines” 
it was referring to the compliance provision under the Organizational Guidelines calling for 
discipline of employees who engage in misconduct. Id. at 342–43. See supra note 23 for a 
discussion of the Organizational Guidelines compliance provision. Thus, a substantial 
severance package would be a relevant consideration. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 344 n.51. 
Nonetheless, the court found that regardless of the government’s intent, given the 
contemporaneity of the legal fees inquiry and the misconduct statement, objectively it could 
have been perceived to imply that the payment of legal fees would be viewed as rewarding 
misconduct under the Thompson Memo. Id. at 342–44. 
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that it would voluntarily pay their legal expenses;71 however, that 
payment would cease if the individual was indicted.72  
The firm’s efforts were successful. In August 2005, KPMG 
entered a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (“DPA”) with the 
government, whereby the government agreed not to prosecute KPMG 
in exchange for, inter alia, KPMG’s admission of wrongdoing, and 
full cooperation with any subsequent government investigation.73 At 
approximately the same time, the government indicted numerous 
KPMG employees (“Defendants”) for tax fraud.74  
Pursuant to their agreement with the Defendants, KPMG ceased 
payment of their legal fees.75 In response, the Defendants promptly 
moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government had 
violated their constitutional rights by improperly interfering with the 
advancement of their legal fees by KPMG.76 In a strongly worded 
opinion, the court agreed.77 
 
 71. Id. at 345–46. KPMG capped the amount it would pay at $400,000 per employee. Id. 
KPMG further conditioned the legal fees payment upon the individual’s full cooperation with 
the government. Id. at 345–46. 
 72. Id. KPMG stipulated that although not mandated by state law or explicit in its 
partnership agreement, “it had been the longstanding voluntary practice of KPMG to advance 
and pay the legal fees [of its employees], without a present cap or condition of cooperation with 
the government” where criminal or civil charges were brought against the individual “involving 
activities arising within the scope of the individual’s [employment].” Id. at 340. KPMG also 
stipulated however, that it was not aware of any KPMG partners or employees who had been 
indicted for conduct arising within the scope of employment since 1974, when two partners 
were indicted. Id. With regard to the 1974 indictments, although KPMG had no records 
showing payment of the partners’ legal fees, it believed that the fees were paid by KPMG. Id.  
 73. Id. at 349. The terms of the DPA actually call for KPMG to be charged with a one-
count information. Id. The government agreed to seek dismissal of the information if KPMG 
complied with the provisions of the DPA. Id. For a complete copy of the DPA, see 
Memorandum from David Kelley, U.S. Attorney, Southern District of N.Y., to Robert Bennett, 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, & Flom LLP (Aug. 26, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj. 
gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/August05/kpmgdpagmt.pdf. 
 74. See Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 350; see also Press Release, Department of Justice, 
KPMG to Pay $456 Million for Criminal Violations in Relation to Largest-Ever Tax Shelter 
Fraud Case (Aug. 29, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/August/ 
05_ag_433.html. The government later filed a superseding indictment naming nineteen 
defendants, almost all of whom were KPMG employees. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, 19 
Individuals Charged in Superseding Indictment Filed in Criminal Tax Case Related To KPMG 
Tax Shelters (Oct. 17, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/ 
October05/kpmgsupersedingindictmentpr.pdf.  
 75. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 350. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See generally Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330. Throughout the opinion the court harshly 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/15
p 379 Rehmann book pages.doc  7/29/2008 10:49:00 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008]  Employees’ Legal Fees 395 
 
 
First, the court held that the government had violated the 
Defendants’ Fifth Amendment78 right to fairness in the criminal 
process.79 The court reached this conclusion by first finding that the 
right to “obtain and use in order to prepare a defense resources 
lawfully available to [a defendant], free of knowing or reckless 
government interference” is a “fundamental” right.80 Next, the court 
concluded that the Thompson Memo impinged on this fundamental 
right.81 This is so, the court reasoned, because the Thompson Memo 
interfered with the ability of the Defendants to obtain resources to 
defend themselves that they otherwise would have had.82 
Consequently, the court opined that the Thompson Memo and the 
government’s actions thereunder were subject to strict scrutiny.83  
Applying the strict scrutiny standard, the court found that the 
Thompson Memo was not the least restrictive alternative to achieve a 
compelling government interest.84 In that regard, the court reasoned 
that although “[a]ny government’s interest in investigating and fairly 
 
criticizes the USAO’s actions in implementing the Thomson Memo. See, e.g., id. at 336 (“The 
government . . . has let its zeal get in the way of its judgment. It has violated the Constitution it 
is sworn to defend.”) 
 In a companion opinion Judge Kaplan also holds that the Thompson Memo improperly 
interfered with certain Defendants Fifth Amendment right against making self incriminating 
statements. See United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 331–33, 337 (citing U.S. CONST. 
amend. V). In that case the court opined that, in an effort to be viewed as “cooperative” under 
the Thompson Memo guidelines, KPMG’s threats to terminate the Defendants’ employment, or 
cut off payment of their legal fees, impermissibly compelled the Defendants to make self 
incriminating statements to the government. Id. at 334–35.  
 78. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 79. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362. The right to fairness in the criminal process is protected 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at. 357.  
 80. Id. at 361–62.  
 81. Id. at 362. 
 82. Id. Previously in the opinion, the court concluded that the language of the Thompson 
Memo implied that a corporation’s payment of legal fees to indicted employees would be held 
against the corporation. Id. at 352–53. And that “absent the Thompson Memo . . . KPMG would 
have paid the legal fees” of its employees both prior to and after indictment, consistent with “its 
long-standing policy of paying legal fees” of its employees “in all cases.” Id. at 353, 352. But 
cf. supra note 72 for a discussion of KPMG’s history of paying its employees’ legal fees. 
 83. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The strict scrutiny 
test requires that the government’s purpose for impingement on fundamental rights be 
“legitimate” or “compelling” and the means employed to achieve that purpose be “necessary” 
or the “least restrictive alternative.” See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 520 (2d ed. 2002).  
 84. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 364. 
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prosecuting crime is compelling . . . the Thompson Memorandum 
does not say that payment of legal fees may cut in favor of indictment 
only if it is used as a means to obstruct an investigation.”85 Therefore, 
the court held, the Thompson Memo “burdens excessively the 
constitutional rights of the individuals whose ability to defend 
themselves it impairs” and, accordingly, violates the Fifth 
Amendment.86  
Second, the court held that the Thompson Memo, and the 
government’s implementation, violated the Defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.87 This was so, according to the court, 
because “[t]he Thompson Memorandum discourages and, as a 
practical matter, often prevents companies from providing employees 
. . . with the financial means to exercise their constitutional rights to 
defend themselves.”88 The court reasoned, “[T]hat advancement of 
legal fees might occasionally be part of an obstruction scheme or 
indicate a lack of full cooperation . . . is insufficient to justify the 
government’s interference with the right of individual criminal 
defendants to obtain resources lawfully available to them in order to 
defend themselves . . . .”89 
Yet, despite the court’s pointed language admonishing the 
Thompson Memo, it initially refused to dismiss the indictment or 
order either the government or KPMG to advance the Defendants’ 
legal fees.90 Instead, the court invited the Defendants to bring a civil 
suit against KPMG to compel the firm to fund their defense and 
ordered the criminal proceedings stayed pending the outcome of the 
civil suit.91 Only after the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed 
the Defendants’ civil suit against KPMG, holding that an ancillary 
 
 85. Id. at 363. 
 86. Id. at 364. 
 87. Id. at 367 (citing U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI).  
 88. Id. at 368. 
 89. Id. at 369. 
 90. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 374, 376, 380.  
 91. Id. at 380. Pursuant to the court’s suggestion, in July 2006, the Defendants filed a 
complaint against KPMG for advancement of their defense costs. Complaint for Advancement, 
Stein v. KPMG LLP, No. 1:06-cv-5007-LAK, 2006 WL 2922089 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2006). 
Interestingly, despite the court’s holding against government interference with the Defendants’ 
access to legal fees, it urged the government to use its “substantial influence” and “power to 
cause KMPG to advance the defense costs.” Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 380.  
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civil proceeding was not the proper remedy,92 did the Stein court, in a 
later opinion, dismiss the criminal indictments against the majority of 
the Defendants.93  
C. The Legislative Branch 
Shortly after the Stein opinion came down, and perhaps in 
response thereto, Congress joined the attack on the Thompson Memo. 
In September 2006, the Senate Judiciary Committee (“Committee”) 
held a hearing to discuss the effects of the Thompson Memo.94 At the 
hearing, Senators, institutional advocates, and corporate defenses 
lawyers testified, eschewing harsh criticism of the Thompson 
Memo.95 
The Chair of the Committee, Senator Arlen Specter, began the 
proceeding by bluntly stating that the Thompson Memo’s 
“consideration of the, ‘Value of a corporation’s cooperation,’ in 
charging [decisions] . . . is coercive. [I]t even rise[s] to the level of 
being obliging.”96 Moreover, in an apparent reference to the Stein 
holding,97 Senator Specter opined, “I do not think somebody ought to 
get credit for waiving a constitutional right, or ought to get . . . a 
demerit or a deficit for asserting a constitutional right.”98 Senator 
 
 92. Stein v. KPMG, 486 F.3d 753 (2d. Cir. 2007). The Second Circuit held that even if 
there were constitutional violations, “more direct (and far less cumbersome) remedies are 
available.” Id. at 763. Namely, the court stated that dismissal of the indictment, allowing the 
Defendants to seek post-conviction relief, or ordering cessation of the constitutionally offensive 
conduct were the proper remedies available to the Stein court. Id. Notably, however, the Second 
Circuit refrained from addressing the merits of the Stein decision. Id. at 756. 
 93. United States v. Stein, No. S1 05 Crim. 0888, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 
2007). The court ordered the criminal indictments to be dismissed against all but three of the 
former KPMG employees. Id. at 394. Two of the three former employees whose indictments 
were not dismissed had left KPMG before they engaged in the conduct for which they were 
indicted. Id. The third former employee whose indictment was not dismissed had signed a 
release, before leaving the firm, releasing KPMG from all contractual liabilities. Id. at 426.  
 94. The Thompson Memorandum’s Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate 
Investigations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (forthcoming 
2007), available at Fed. News Service (Sept. 12, 2006) (Lexis) [hereinafter Comm. Hearing]. 
 95. See Lynnley Browning, Justice Department Is Reviewing Corporate Prosecution 
Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2006, at C3. 
 96. Comm. Hearing, supra note 94, at *10. 
 97. See supra notes 79, 87 and accompanying text. 
 98. Comm. Hearing, supra note 94, at *11. 
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Specter went on to ask Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty, who 
was testifying at the hearing, to reconsider the policy.99  
Despite the Senator’s request and McNulty’s pledge to “consider 
all possibilities,”100 on December 8, 2006, Senator Specter introduced 
legislation that effectively spelled the end of the Thompson Memo.101 
The bill, whose stated purpose is “to place on each agency clear and 
practical limits designed to . . . preserve the constitutional rights and 
other legal protections available to employees,” in relevant part 
provides: 
[A]n agent or attorney of the United States shall not . . . 
condition a civil or criminal charging decision relating to an 
organization . . . on, or use as a factor in determining whether 
an organization . . . is cooperating with the Government . . . the 
provision of counsel to, or contribution to the legal defense 
fees or expenses of, an employee of that organization.”102  
D. The Executive Branch 
Despite executive branch officials’ satisfaction with the state of 
corporate prosecutions under the Thompson Memo,103 less than a 
 
 99. Id. at *10.  
 100. See id. 
 101. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, S. 30, 109th Cong. (2006). See also 
John J. Carney & Dennis O. Cohen, McNulty Memo: Changes Game or Keeps Congress Out?, 
237 N.Y.L.J. 4 (2007) (“In what may have been a high stakes game of chicken, Senator Arlen 
Specter” introduced a bill “that would completely moot many of the hotly contested issues 
raised by the Thompson Memorandum.”). An identical version of the bill was re-introduced by 
Senator Specter at the beginning of the 2007 term. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act 
of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 102. S. 186, The 110th Cong. (2007) (referred to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Jan. 4, 
2007) The language of the bill coincides with suggestions given by other witnesses testifying at 
the Committee hearing. See, e.g., Comm. Hearing, supra note 94, at *15 (testimony of Edwin 
Meese, former Att’y Gen.) (“I think that all reference in the memorandum to a company’s 
payment of its employees’ legal fees . . . should be eliminated.”); id. at *19 (testimony of Karen 
Mathis, President, Am. Bar Ass’n) (“The ABA urges the committee to encourage the Justice 
Department to eliminate these employee-related provisions from the Thompson 
Memorandum.”). The bill has been referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee for 
consideration. 153 CONG. REC. S41 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 2007).  
 103. See, e.g., CORP. FRAUD TASK FORCE, SECOND YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
(2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/2nd_yr_fraud_report.pdf. (“[W]e have met 
the President’s charge—we are cleaning up corporate board rooms . . . and importantly, the 
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week after Senator Specter introduced his bill, the DOJ caved to the 
mounting pressure. On December 12, 2006, Deputy Attorney General 
Paul McNulty introduced new guidelines to supersede the Thompson 
Memo (“McNulty Memo”).104 The McNulty Memo carries over the 
same factors outlined by the Thompson Memo, including the much 
criticized fourth factor which focuses prosecutors’ attention on the 
“corporation’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its 
agents.”105  
Notwithstanding its lip service to the Thompson Memo,106 
however, the McNulty Memo puts bright-line limits on “[r]elevant 
considerations in determining whether a corporation has 
cooperated.”107 Namely, the McNulty Memo provides that 
“[p]rosecutors generally should not take into account whether a 
corporation is advancing attorneys’ fees to employees or agents under 
investigation”.108 Instead, the memo asserts that only “[i]n extremely 
 
confidence of the American public in the integrity of our financial markets is returning. . . .”); 
Paul McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, Let’s Make a Deal: The Question of Privilege (Sept. 
13, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/dag_speech_060913.htm (“The 
analysis in the Thompson Memo is transparent, simple, and relies on the common sense 
approach prosecutors have been using for decades.”).  
 104. Memorandum from Paul McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, to all U.S.D.O.J. Heads 
of Department Components and U.S. Attorneys (2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memo] (on file 
with the U.S.D.O.J.), available at http://www.lawprofessors.typepad.com/whiecollarcrime_ 
blog/files/mcnulty-memo.pdf; Paul McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, Prepared Remarks of 
Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty at the Lawyers for Civil Justice Membership 
Conference Regarding the Department’s Charging Guidelines in Corporate Fraud Prosecutions 
(Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty remarks], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/ 
2006/dag_speech_061212.htm. 
 105. Compare McNulty Memo, supra note 104, § III.A with Thompson Memo, supra note 
38, § II.A. 
 106. See, e.g., McNulty Memo, supra note 104, at introductory cmt. (“I remain convinced 
that the fundamental principles that have guided our enforcement practices are sound.”); 
McNulty Remarks, supra note 104 (“The new memorandum clarifies the intent of the 
Thompson Memorandum.”). 
 107. McNulty Memo, supra note 104, § VII.B.  
 108. Id. § VII.B.3 (emphasis added). This guidance is in direct contrast to the Thompson 
Memo’s provision that “a corporation’s promise of support to culpable employees . . . through 
the advancing of attorneys fees . . . may be considered by prosecutors in weighing the extent 
and value of a corporation’s cooperation.” Thompson Memo, supra note 38, § VI.B. The 
McNulty Memo also significantly changes the circumstances in which prosecutors may request 
waiver of a corporation’s attorney-client privilege. See McNulty Memo, supra note 104, 
§ VII.B.2. For an in-depth discussion of the McNulty Memo’s revision to prosecutorial 
privilege waiver policies see Thomas C. Frongillo & Elisa Jaclyn, DOJ’s Revision of its 
Charging Guidelines in Corporate Prosecutions, in 21 ANDREWS WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 
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rare cases,” may the advancement of attorneys’ fees be taken into 
account.109 When such “rare cases” arise, approval must be sought 
from the Deputy Attorney General.110 Ironically, McNulty’s softening 
of the Thompson Memo came the very day that Jeffrey Skilling, the 
last of the major players in the Enron scandal, was ordered to begin 
serving a twenty-four year sentence for his role in the fraud that 
sparked the drafting of the Thompson Memo.111  
III. HAS THE PROBLEM BEEN SOLVED?  
A. Preliminary Matters 
Before we ask whether the solutions proposed by the judiciary or 
Congress, or the one adopted by the DOJ, provide a successful 
resolution to the criticisms lodged against prosecutors’ consideration 
of legal fees advancement, it is instructional to further examine the 
underlying premises of the critics’ positions.  
1. Possibility of Coercion 
There is little doubt that a criminal indictment can have 
devastating effects on a corporation. This is especially true where the 
entity’s business is almost entirely dependant on its reputation. In the 
financial services industry in which KPMG is engaged, an indictment 
can, and has, been “tantamount to a death sentence.”112 Consequently, 
it can be argued that anything the government may consider, which 
lessens the chance of indictment is “coercive” in that companies have 
a massive financial incentive to avoid indictment.113 Flatly enforcing 
 
REPORTER no.5, at 2 (2007). 
 109. McNulty Memo, supra note 104, § VII.B.3 n.3.  
 110. Id. 
 111. See Associated Press, Skilling Is Denied Bail, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at C3. 
 112. Kathleen F. Brickey, Anderson’s Fall from Grace, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 917, 921 (2003). 
See also Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 
487–88 (2005) [hereinafter Buell, The Blaming Function] (discussing a firm’s reputation as its 
“capital, and the vulnerability of that capital in the criminal process”). 
 113. Cf. Written Testimony from Andrew Wiessman, Former Assistant U.S. Attorney, 
Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Concerning the Thompson 
Memorandum’s Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations (Sept. 12, 2006), 
available at http://www.acc.com/public/attyclientpriv/weissmann.pdf (“The current standard for 
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the law, however, by removing opportunities for a target corporation 
to earn leniency would certainly not be a more desirable alternative 
from the corporation’s standpoint.114  
Rather than removing incentives, a more fruitful analysis is to 
focus on the federal system of enterprise criminal liability.115 Under 
the United States’ current respondeat superior regime of corporate 
criminal liability, it is quite easy, especially with large corporations, 
to impute criminal liability onto an employer.116 Virtually all the 
doctrine requires is the wrongdoing of one low-level agent.117 
Therefore, although the factors prosecutors consider when 
determining whether to grant leniency may have a coercive effect, 
eliminating those factors altogether is a misguided remedy. To 
ameliorate the negative effects of the power prosecutors carry, efforts 
should instead focus on examining alternatives or modifications to 
the current system of corporate criminal liability.118  
 
corporate criminal responsibility affords prosecutors enormous—and unduly disproportionate—
leverage and power.”).  
 114. As McNulty observed in his prepared statement submitted at the Committee Hearing, 
“The irony of the attacks on the Thompson Memo is that the federal criminal justice system 
would be a much harsher, less predictable, and less transparent environment for corporations 
and their counsel in the absence of this guidance.” Statement, Paul McNulty, Deputy Attorney 
General, Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Concerning the 
Thompson Memorandum’s Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations (Sept. 
12, 2006), available at http://www.acc.com/resource/getfile.php?id=7554. 
 115. See generally Buell, The Blaming Function, supra note 112, at 478 (arguing for a 
more limited scope of entity criminal liability to “make the doctrine fit better with its 
justifications”). 
 116. See BRICKEY, CORPORATE LIABILITY, supra note 2, at 8–11. Under Federal law, a 
corporation is criminally responsible for the acts of its employees, so long as they are 
committed within the scope of employment and, at least in part, for the benefit of the employer. 
See, e.g., United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Jorgenson, 144 
F.3d 550, 560 (8th Cir. 1998); Mylan Lab., Inc. v. Akzo, 2 F.3d 56, 63 (4th Cir. 1993).  
 117. See Buell, The Blaming Function, supra note 112, at 526 (“[T]he law says firms are 
virtually always answerable for their agents’ crimes, almost without regard to the facts.”). 
 118. See John Hasnas, Do Nothing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2006, at A9 (“Attempting to 
reform DOJ policy without changing the . . . untenable standard of corporate criminal liability 
. . . law is a bit like treating a lung-cancer patient’s cough. . . it won’t hurt, but it won’t help that 
much either.”); Andrew Weismann and David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate 
Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 412, 425 (2007) (The willingness of corporations to cooperate with the 
government “is due in large measure to the vastly disproportionate power of the two sides. 
Prosecutors have enormous leverage due to the doctrine of vicarious liability.”). See also Buell, 
The Blaming Function, supra note 112, at 474–77, 527–37 for a discussion of numerous 
proposed reformations to corporate criminal liability.  
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2. Cooperation as an Appropriate Consideration 
From a historical context, a defendant’s willingness to cooperate 
has long been used in individual prosecutorial and sentencing 
decisions.119 It is likely that this consideration comes from the 
socially accepted view that admission of guilt and acceptance of 
wrongdoing is praiseworthy.120 Moreover, as a practical matter, when 
an entity learns that it is under government scrutiny, it is standard 
practice to begin an internal investigation.121 Indeed, some 
corporations expend huge sums of money hiring outside counsel to 
review documents, conduct employee interviews, and provide 
opinions on the source and extent of any wrongdoing.122 Counsel will 
then likely present their findings to the government to make an 
argument about why the corporation should not be indicted.123 Given 
the amount of resources expended, even if cooperation was not an 
explicit factor in the prosecutor’s decision, the company would likely 
expect leniency, in any event, for its efforts.124 Additionally, to 
require expenditure of government resources to duplicate an 
investigation that a corporation has already completed, and is willing 
to share with the government, would be grossly inefficient and in 
some instances not feasible.125 Thus, providing the target corporation 
with an incentive to cooperate via a credit in the indictment decision 
serves the interests of both the target corporation and the government. 
 
 119. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2004); supra notes 18, 22–24 
and accompanying text.  
 120. By cooperating with the government, firms hope to “dampen [the] reputation effects” 
of an investigation because the public recognizes that “acceptance of responsibility . . . is 
essential to the credibility” of the firm. Buell, The Blaming Function, supra note 112, at 507.  
 121. See generally Kestenbaum & Criss, supra note 11, at 151–52 (cataloging the benefits 
a company reaps, and the risks it avoids, by conducting internal investigations). 
 122. See Robeck et al., supra note 9, at 25–26 (discussing the general process of internal 
investigations). 
 123. See Kestenbaum & Criss, supra note 11, at 151–52.  
 124. See Comm. Hearing, supra note 94, at 6–8 (testimony of Paul McNulty, Deputy 
Attorney General). 
 125. See Interview with United States Attorney James B. Comey Regarding the Department 
of Justice’s Policy on Requesting Corporations under Criminal Investigation to Waive the 
Attorney Client Privilege and Work Product Protection, 51 U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL., Nov. 2003, at 
3–4, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5106.pdf. 
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3. The Relevancy of Advancing Legal Fees 
It is important to remember that, although corporations are 
considered legal entities under the law, the only way that they can act 
is through their agents.126 When a corporation admits wrongdoing, 
the underlying admission is that one or more of its employees have 
engaged in wrongdoing.127 Accordingly, it is contrary to the very idea 
of cooperation if the corporation seeks leniency by admitting 
wrongdoing and pledges to root out the wrongdoers, yet in actuality 
attempts to shield the culpable employees from liability by 
voluntarily paying their defense fees without any legal or contractual 
impetus.128 Indeed, the court in Stein admitted as much129 and drew 
an analogy to the Watergate case, in which the legal fees of the 
individuals who broke into the offices of the Democratic National 
Committee were paid “to buy the silence of the [wrongdoers] and to 
protect higher-ups.”130 Corporate equivalents, the Stein court 
observed, “no doubt occur.”131 
The relevancy issue notwithstanding, a primary criticism of 
factoring the advancement of employee legal fees into corporate 
indictment decisions is the application of this consideration before a 
finding of employee culpability has been made.132 The Stein court 
and others have rightly observed, “The imposition of economic 
 
 126. See BRICKEY, CORPORATE LIABILITY, supra note 2, at 89. 
 127. Id. at 89–90. 
 128. Significantly, throughout the evolution of DOJ policy, as articulated by the Holder, 
Thompson, and McNulty Memos, the advancement of legal fees has consistently been only one 
factor in determining whether the entity is in fact cooperating, which itself is only one factor 
among many that prosecutors are instructed to consider in making indictment decisions. See 
supra note 14 and text accompanying notes 42, 105. Similarly, DOJ policy has recognized that 
where state or contractual law places legal obligations on employers to indemnify employees, 
payment of employee legal fees may not be considered by prosecutors. See McNulty Memo, 
supra note 104, § VII.B.3. For example, organizations incorporated in Delaware are mandated 
to pay the legal fees of their employees who are successful on the merits of a criminal or civil 
action brought against them. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (2001). In such instances, 
indemnification may not weigh into prosecutorial decisions.  
 129. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[No one] 
suggest[s] that an entity’s obstruction of a government investigation . . . should be ignored in a 
charging decision.”).  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. 
 132. See supra note 51 and text accompanying note 85. 
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punishment by prosecutors, before anyone has been found guilty of 
anything, is not a legitimate governmental interest . . . .”133 However, 
the solutions that have been proposed by the judicial, legislative, and 
executive branches134 to curb illegitimate application of this factor 
fall well short of the mark. 
B. The Judicial Resolution is Inadequate 
Stein attempted to use the Constitution to rein in the 
government.135 One commentator has exposed this solution as a “red 
herring.”136 What’s more, subsequent courts have found ways to 
distinguish Stein137 or have flatly refused to follow the precedent, 
finding the reasoning “unpersuasive.”138 Regardless of how it is 
characterized, the court’s solution fails on a number of grounds. 
The court goes through excruciating efforts to craft a finding that 
a defendant’s right to use “available resources” for his or her defense, 
free from government interference, is a “fundamental right” protected 
by the Fifth Amendment.139 In reaching this holding, however, Stein 
primarily draws on dicta from other courts.140 Indeed, the court 
admits that this right “has not been explicitly so characterized by the 
[Supreme] Court.”141 The Supreme Court has, in fact, reserved the 
label of “fundamental right” for only those rights that are “deeply 
rooted in this nation’s history and tradition and implicit in the 
 
 133. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 363.  
 134. See discussion supra Part II.B–D. 
 135. See supra text accompanying notes 79–90. 
 136. See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 
1659 (2007) [hereinafter Buell, Criminal Procedure].  
 137. See, e.g., U.S. v. Galante, No. 3:06CR161 (EBB), slip op. at 3 (D. Conn. Nov. 28, 
2006) (distinguishing United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) on the facts). 
 138. See U.S. v. Stodder, No. 2:05-CR-00027, 2006 WL 3066196, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 
2006) (“[T]he Stein decision [is] scholarly but ultimately unpersuasive” because of “no support 
for [its holding] in the Supreme Court decisions cited in Stein or in any appellate court 
decisions.”). But see United States v. Payment Processing Ctr., LLC, 439 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439 
(E.D. Pa. 2006) (citing favorably United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 349–53 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)).  
 139. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 361–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). To reach this 
legal conclusion the court’s reasoning spans seven pages of the reporter. See id. at 356–63. 
 140. See id. at 361.  
 141. Id. at 360. 
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concept of ordered liberty.”142 Examples of recognized fundamental 
rights, which include the right to vote,143 freedom of speech,144 and 
the right to privacy,145 are limited and do not seem at all analogous to 
an expectation to be indemnified by one’s employer for potentially 
criminal activity.146 Stein’s characterization of the right as 
“fundamental” is crucial to its holding because that is the only way 
the court can examine the Thompson Memo under strict scrutiny.147 
Without applying a strict scrutiny test, the government’s action under 
the Thompson Memo is much more likely to be upheld.148 
The court’s Sixth Amendment argument is also problematic. 
Assuming arguendo that the court was correct in its novel finding 
that employees have a “property” interest in the expectation, even 
absent a statutory or contractual mandate, in their legal fees being 
paid by their employer,149 the true detriment of relying on the Sixth 
Amendment as a solution is that it has a limited application. An 
individual’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until 
the government has initiated adversarial judicial criminal proceedings 
against the individual.150 Therefore, in situations where a corporation 
preemptively refuses to pay the legal fees of an employee under 
investigation, in order to curry government favor, the Sixth 
 
 142. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003) (internal citations omitted).  
 143. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969). 
 144. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 336 n.1 (1995).  
 145. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 926–27 (1992). 
 146. Indeed, when conducting its Sixth Amendment analysis later in the opinion, the court 
draws a closer analogy between the Defendants’ “right” to legal fees advancement and a 
property right. U.S. v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also infra note 149 
and accompanying text for further discussion on this point.  
 147. The most intensive kind of judicial scrutiny, strict scrutiny, is only used when courts 
evaluate discrimination based on national origin or for interference with fundamental rights. See 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 83, at 520. 
 148. “The level of scrutiny used [by a court] is very likely to determine the outcome. If 
rational basis review is applied, the law is likely to be upheld. If strict scrutiny is used, the law 
is likely to be struck down.” Id. 
 149. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 367 (2006) (Defendants’ expectation that their legal fees 
would be paid by KPMG “and any benefits that would have flowed from that expectation—the 
legal fees at issue now—were, in every material sense, their property.”).  
 150. U.S. v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984). Although the right to counsel may attach 
for “critical pretrial proceedings,” the government must first have “committed itself to 
prosecute.” (internal quotations omitted) Id.   
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Amendment would afford no protection to that employee until after 
he or she has been indicted.  
Although this was not the situation with the KPMG Defendants, it 
is certainly plausible that such situations can, and do, arise. There are 
a myriad of investigative techniques that prosecutors employ before 
an indictment decision is made, where employees would be well 
advised to have the assistance of counsel.151 Thus, from the 
standpoint of crafting a resolution that sets forth clear guidelines that 
that can be broadly applied, relying on the protections afforded by the 
Sixth Amendment fails.  
C. The Legislative Branch’s Resolution is Inadequate 
Congress, as well as many advocates in the private sector, 
proposes completely eliminating advancement of employees’ legal 
fees from prosecutorial consideration.152 This solution is clearly a 
case of throwing out the baby with the bathwater. It altogether 
ignores that such activity can in fact be used to impede enforcement 
objectives153 and gives the misguided impression that such conduct 
does not, or will not, occur.154 
Much of Senator Specter’s criticism is based on the premise that 
there ought not be credit given for “waiving constitutional rights.”155 
Putting the questionable validity of his constitutional argument aside, 
the Senator fails to acknowledge that the practice of crediting 
defendants for waiving rights guaranteed under the Constitution is 
widely accepted throughout the criminal justice system.156 For 
example, the Constitution guarantees all criminal defendants the right 
 
 151. See Gabriel L. Imperato, Internal Investigations, Government Investigations, 
Whistleblower Concerns, 51 ALA. L. REV. 205, 226–30 (1999) (summarizing techniques 
employed by the government in corporate criminal investigations).  
 152. See discussion supra Parts II.A, C. 
 153. See supra text accompanying notes 126–31. 
 154. See Buell, Criminal Procedure, supra note 136, at 1660 (“[I]t is undeniably true that a 
firm’s selection and funding of counsel for its agents, in relation to a situation where a firm 
does not do so, does impede [DOJ] regulation.”). 
 155. Comm. Hearing, supra note 94, at *10 (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 156. As McNulty pointed out during his testimony at the Committee Hearing, 
“[T]housands of criminals today as we sit here will receive that very benefit for waiving a 
constitutional right.” Comm. Hearing, supra note 94, at *12. 
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to a jury trial.157 Yet it is commonplace for criminal defendants to 
earn leniency in charging and sentencing decisions for waiving their 
constitutional right to trial and entering a plea.158  
D. The Executive Branch’s Resolution is Inadequate 
The executive branch’s response, via the McNulty Memo, 
attempts to address critics’ concerns,159 but the result is untenable. 
The Memo both places a general ban on the consideration of 
employee legal fees advancement, while at the same time admitting 
that legal fees advancement can, in some circumstances, be intended 
to impede investigations.160 Indeed, it provides little guidance for 
prosecutors to identify the “extremely rare cases [when] advancement 
of attorney’s fees may be taken into account.”161 
Moreover, the McNulty Memo’s labeling of cases where payment 
of legal fees may be collusive conduct as “extremely rare”162 is 
dangerously short-sighted. Especially in the corporate context, it is 
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to predict the frequency or 
manifestations that deceptive conduct of corporate insiders might 
assume.163 Yet, the McNulty Memo’s implication that collusion 
through the advancement of legal fees is unlikely to occur purports to 
do just that.164 Even more troubling, by directing prosecutorial 
 
 157. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 158. See Comm. Hearing, supra note 94, at *12 (testimony of Paul McNulty, Deputy Att’y 
Gen.). See also U.S. ATTY’YS’ MANUAL supra note 17, § 9-27.400.B (setting out types of plea 
agreements whereby, in return for a defendant’s plea to an offense, the prosecutor may dismiss 
other charges or request a reduced sentence); U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual 
§ 3E1.1(b) (2005) (allowing a reduction in sentence for entering a guilty plea).  
 159. See discussion supra Part II.D. 
 160. McNulty Memo, supra note 104, § VII.B.3. 
 161. Id. § VII.B.3 n.3. McNulty states that prosecutors should look at the “totality of the 
circumstances” but no further guidance is provided. Id.  
 162. Id. 
 163. Indeed, a primary contributing factor to the devastating effects of the Enron type 
financial crimes is that the “institutional watchdogs,” including the DOJ, who work to protect 
investors from false or misleading information, were not able to see through the deceptive 
practices of corporate management. See Kroger, supra note 27, at 59–61. Kroger, a former 
prosecutor on the Enron Task Force, states that the “disaster occurred largely because of a 
troubling gap between [outsider] perception[s] and [company] reality.” Id. at 59. Subsequent 
reforms have done little to combat this problem. Id. at 61.  
 164. Cf. McNulty Memo, supra note 104, § VII.B.3. 
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attention away from the possibility of collusion through the payment 
of employee legal fees, it opens the door for this practice to become 
more prevalent.  
IV. PROPOSAL 
The discourse presented in this Note has established a number of 
propositions. First, it is desirable for prosecutors to have the 
discretion to take a target corporation’s cooperation into account 
when making their indictment decision.165 Second, whether the 
corporation, while not legally obligated to do so, voluntarily pays the 
legal fees of wrongdoing employees is a relevant and important factor 
for prosecutors to take into consideration in weighing the value of the 
corporation’s cooperation.166 In that vein, any policy that purports to 
flatly ban prosecutors from considering a corporation’s payment of 
legal fees to its culpable agents is ill conceived.167 Finally, without a 
clearly defined standard to determine when the consideration of legal 
fees payment is legitimate, there is the possibility that prosecutors 
could either abuse their power, or at least cause corporations to “play 
it safe” and refuse to pay the legal fees of innocent employees.168 
Thus, any adequate solution must allow prosecutors the discretion to 
take into consideration legal fee advancement to culpable employees, 
and it must also set out a clear standard to inform prosecutors when 
employees are sufficiently culpable so as to make legal fee 
advancement an appropriate consideration under the circumstances. 
To accomplish this, I propose a guideline which encourages 
prosecutors to credit a target corporation with leniency if it has 
cooperated with the government investigation. If, however, the 
corporation chooses to advance legal fees to its employees who are 
culpably involved in the underlying criminal misconduct, without a 
legal obligation to do so, it may be within the prosecutor’s discretion 
to consider such behavior as uncooperative. Significantly, before a 
prosecutor may exercise that discretion, he or she must seek a judicial 
 
 165. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 166. See discussion supra Part III.A.3. 
 167. See discussion supra Part III.C.  
 168. See supra note 51 and text accompanying note 85. 
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determination, based on a showing of probable cause, that the 
employee is culpably involved in the underlying offense. Consistent 
with longstanding Supreme Court precedent, a showing of probable 
cause would require the prosecutor to proffer “enough particularized 
facts to lead a common sense person of reasonable caution to believe 
that there is a fair probability of criminal activity”169 committed by 
the agent. 
Like the apparent goal of the McNulty Memo, 170 this standard 
limits the discretion of prosecutors, so as to minimize, if not 
eliminate, the possibility of abuse. On the other hand, this standard 
differs from the McNulty Memo in several respects. First, it is 
significantly more practical for a prosecutor to simply seek a finding 
of probable cause from a local judge or magistrate rather than 
requiring every prosecutor in the country to seek approval from one 
person: the Deputy Attorney General.171 Second, a judge is a neutral, 
and detached, party who can objectively review the request from a 
prosecutor.172 The Deputy Attorney General, on the other hand, is a 
 
 169. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., BOOK, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 100 (3d ed. 2003) 
(citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)). According to Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
“The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best 
compromise that has been found for accommodating the [] often opposing interests” between 
safeguarding citizens’ rights and allowing law enforcement fair leeway to protect the 
community. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). To that end, the degree of 
probability needed to establish probable cause is something “more than bare suspicion,” but 
“less than evidence which would justify condemnation.” Id. at 175–76. 
 170. Cf. McNulty Memo, supra note 104, at introductory cmt. (stating that the 
“adjust[ments] [to] certain aspects of” DOJ policy contained in the McNulty Memo are 
designed to “further promote public confidence in the Department”). 
 171. Cf. id. § VII.B.3 n.3 (“[A]pproval must be obtained from the Deputy Attorney General 
before prosecutors may consider” the advancement of attorneys’ fees). 
 172. One might argue that this standard would only add to the already heavy workload 
local judges and magistrates handle, thereby running the risk that judicial review of 
prosecutors’ evidence regarding employee culpability may be cursory at best. Craig D. Uchida 
& Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants, Motions to Suppress and “Lost Cases:” The Effects of 
the Exclusionary Rule in Seven Jurisdictions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1034, 1057–58 
(1991) (finding that in at least one community, judges only spent an average of five to thirty 
minutes reviewing the evidence of probable cause for warrant applications, and that out of 
1,748 warrant applications, only one was rejected). Whatever the risks, however, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that a probable cause determination by “a neutral and detached 
judicial officer is a more reliable safeguard against [impingement on individual rights] than the 
hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime.” Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979) (examining 
probable cause in the setting of unreasonable searches). Moreover, a judicial officer is better 
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decidedly interested party.173 Finally, and most important, the 
requirement of probable cause provides prosecutors with a clear 
standard, rather than the vague and contradictory guidance provided 
by the McNulty Memo.174  
Additionally, this standard better comports with corporate 
interests. Under the McNulty Memo, a corporation still has no way to 
determine ex ante whether a prosecutor may seek approval to take the 
payment of legal fees into consideration. Therefore, given the 
stakes,175 it is likely that a conservative corporation will still err on 
the side of caution and refuse payment of legal fees to its employees, 
whether culpable or not.176 In contrast, under a probable cause 
standard, although there will still be some uncertainty, corporate 
counsel is provided with a much clearer projection of whether it risks 
adverse consequences from a decision to advance the legal fees of the 
corporation’s employees under government investigation. 
Moreover, a showing of probable cause will sufficiently address 
Stein’s concern over the arguable property interests an individual 
may have flowing from an expectation to have his or her legal fees 
advanced.177 Probable cause as a justification for impinging 
individuals’ property rights under certain circumstances is a mainstay 
of constitutional jurisprudence. For example, in the context of the 
 
suited to maintain a standard of review that is at least as objective, if not more so, than the 
Deputy Attorney General, who may be prone to “rubber stamping” recommendations by local 
prosecutors or rejecting valid recommendations due to political pressures. See infra note 173 
and accompanying text. Indeed, the promulgation of the McNulty Memo itself was at least 
partially in response to political pressure on the Deputy Attorney General. See Comm. Hearing, 
supra note 94, at *11 (testimony of Paul McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen.) (“Look, I’ve got 
[congressmen] upset. I’ve got former DOJ officials writing letters. We’ve got everybody 
complaining. The easiest thing for me to do today would be to . . . go ahead and change the 
[Thompson Memo] and make everybody happy.”).  
 173. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971) (The “chief government 
enforcement agent of the state—the Attorney General” is per se disqualified from determining 
sufficient probable cause to issue a warrant because “prosecutors and policemen simply cannot 
be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to their own investigations-the 
(competitive enterprise) that must rightly engage their single-minded attention.”).  
 174. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
 175. See supra note 112. 
 176. Indeed, this was a primary concern of many critics of the Thompson Memo. See supra 
note 51 and text accompanying note 85. 
 177. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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Fourth Amendment,178 probable cause ordinarily justifies law 
enforcement’s seizure (and search) of both person and property.179 
Even more analogous, the Supreme Court has held that, 
notwithstanding Fifth and Sixth Amendment guarantees,180 in certain 
circumstances, probable cause justifies the government freezing a 
defendant’s funds even “before he is convicted-and before [the funds] 
are finally adjudged to be forfeitable.181  
CONCLUSION 
The Thompson Memo was fashioned as a quick and much-needed 
response to combat new developments in corporate crime and hold 
those responsible accountable.182 Arguments that have been 
subsequently raised against its amorphous guidance regarding 
employee legal fees advancement have proven meritorious. The 
Thompson Memo’s faults, however, are not adequately addressed by 
passing legislation or promulgating new guidelines that either restrict 
prosecutors from taking into account relevant and legitimate factors, 
or provide no further guidance on when those factors should be 
employed. In balancing the interests of innocent employees with 
legitimate law enforcement concerns, the proper solution is to 
provide a bright-line standard for determining when a target 
corporation’s payment of legal fees is a legitimate consideration and 
how that determination must be made. Such a bright-line rule is 
attained by conditioning prosecutors’ consideration of legal fee 
advancement on a judicial finding of probable cause that the 
employee is culpably involved in the underlying criminal offense of 
the corporation. 
 
 178. U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV (protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures).  
 179. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996) (“[T]he usual rule [is] that 
probable cause to believe the law has been broken ‘outbalances’ [the] private interest[s] in 
avoiding” impingement on Fourth Amendment rights.) (internal citations omitted). 
 180. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V, VI. The Sixth Amendment protects criminal defendants’ right 
to choice of counsel and the Fifth Amendment “guarantees . . . a ‘balance of forces’ between 
the accused and the Government.” U.S. v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 614 (1989). 
 181. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 614–15. (holding that courts are authorized to enter a pre-trial 
order seizing a defendant’s assets, even where those assets would be used to pay legal fees, if 
the assets would be subject to forfeiture upon conviction).  
 182. See supra Part I.B. 
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